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THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM ARGUMENT
Loren Meierding

In antiquity the consensus gentium argument for God's existence was believed to
have merit (cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Book II, sect.2,4), but has been considered blatantly fallacious during more recent times. In this article Bayes'
Theorem is applied to show that the argument is in fact a valid inductive argument. A two hypothesis and a four hypothesis version of the argument are analyzed. Perusal of available statistical evidence suggests that when better worldwide opinion polling data becomes available it will turn out to be sound as well.

In antiquity the consensus gentium argument for God's existence was
taken seriously. As its name indicates, it is the argument that the
common consent, agreement, or belief among human beings that God
exists justifies believing that God does truly exist. The argument
dates back to the Stoics. It is the argument which Cicero invokes in
his De Natura Deorum (Book II, sect. 2, 4). Cicero implies that it is the
fact that men believe in the gods that warrants believing that they
exist. Indeed, he claims that human belief in them grows stronger
with the passage of time. Consequently, there is little need to discuss
the question of their existence. The main question of interest is what
nature they have. Cicero repeats the reasons Cleanthes the Stoic
gives on why people believe in the divine. The reasons cited are
augurial predictions of future events, the blessings people enjoy, the
display of force in nature, and beauty and design of nature (Book II,
sect. 5). The argument from design is really the chief basis for people's belief in the divine according to Cicero, but the general belief
people have in divine beings is the fact that settles the question of
their existence.
Although the consensus gentium argument was considered important
by ancient writers, in modern times the argument is not taken seriously.
Indeed, the argument seems so blatantly fallacious that when Paul
Edwards wrote his article on the consensus gentium argument for the
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, he did not find any philosophers among the
exponents of the argument.! However, despite the poor reception the
argument has received during the modern period, when it is examined
as an inductive argument, I believe that it is not fallacious, is not devoid
of value, and does offer support for theism.
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Appropriateness of Applying a Bayesian Approach

The consensus gentium argument argues for the truth of the hypothesis
that God exists based on the evidence of the common belief of men and
women that he exists. Although Cicero may have thought that this evidence by itself was sufficient for believing in God's existence, of greater
interest is whether the argument provides any support for God's existence. With the exception of the ontological argument, the arguments
for God's existence are essentially inductive arguments claiming that
belief in God is justified based on various kinds of available evidence.
Evaluating the consensus gentium argument depends on determining
whether a rational person is justified in increasing his or her degree of
belief in God when the consensus gentium inductive evidence is added to
the background evidence he or she already has. We ask-should a rational person who learns that people, or at least a majority, believe that
God exists increase his or her degree of belief that God exists, perhaps
tipping the balance in favor of believing that God exists? The Bayesian
model for scientific and inductive reasoning provides a powerful conceptual framework for evaluating valid inductive arguments and inductive inferences. 2 The Bayesian approach provides a method to evaluate
the impact of incorporating additional evidence with previously known
or background evidence to determine whether specific new evidence
supports or is evidence against a particular belief or hypothesis. It will
help us judge more objectively the warrant for believing God exists from
the consensus gentium evidence.'
The Bayesian model is in accord with the basic facts about our epistemic situation. We are limited in knowledge concerning past, present,
and future events and the existence of various hypothetical entities. Some
conceived entities are clearly more probable and likely to exist than others. Presumably we should generally believe statements and hypotheses
that have high probability on our evidence and reject those that have low
probability. If we are rational, we must also be consistent. The axioms of
probability impose constraints on the probability values we can assign to
statements and hypotheses without being guilty of inconsistency. The
Bayesian approach applies these constraints to the analysis of inductive
inference illuminating the rationality of inductive arguments.
By applying the highly plausible and powerful Bayesian approach, it
is possible to develop the consensus gentium argument in a fashion which
shows the argument does have inductive validity, that is, if evidence of
the common consent variety is possessed, then that evidence offers support for God's existence. Actual possession of evidence of common consent would then make the argument sound and strengthen the support
for belief in God's existence. Although the evidence available tends to
suggest this inductively valid argument is probably sound, a definitive
pronouncement on its soundness at this point in time is premature, since
the evidence about the religious beliefs of the majority of people is so
sketchy-opinion polls have been taken in the U.S. and Europe, but not
worldwide. Deeper investigation of the evidence about people's beliefs
about the divine is needed. Although the argument is inductively valid

THE CONSENSUS GENTiUM ARGUMENT

273

and apparently offers support for theism, this does not mean that it, by
itself, as Cicero thought, must provide sufficient justification for belief in
God's existence. It may, when combined with other evidence, however,
provide sufficient support for rational belief in God's existence. With
the addition of the evidence of common consent to other available evidence, the scale may be tipped in the favor of theism. We are concerned
here only with whether possession of common consent evidence offers
support for God's existence.

The Bayesian Approach
We are interested in deciding what a rational human being should
conclude when presented with evidence that a majority of people
believe that God exists. There are various theistic and non-theistic views
that a person can adopt. When a rational person adds the consensus gentium evidence to the evidence he or she already possesses, it may
increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the probabilities of the different
belief options. The analysis requires a distinction be made between the
evidence offered in an inductive argument to justify accepting or
strengthening one's belief in an hypothesis, let us call this evidence M,
and the background evidence which a person whose rationality or warrant for making an inductive inference is at issue already possesses. Let
the background evidence be E. E includes all evidence possessed by a
person making an inductive inference except M and any evidence entailing M. E is all the evidence that a rational person possesses, but not all
the evidence available. No one can have access to more than a very
small fraction of all the experiences of billions of people.
In order to apply the Bayesian approach, that is, apply Bayes
Theorem, the hypotheses analyzed must include a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. For each hypothesis in the set there are
three probabilities which must be distinguished. The first is the prior
probability of an hypothesis. It is the conditional probability of the
hypothesis on the background evidence E alone. The second is the liklihood of an hypothesis. It also is a conditional probability. Unlike the
other probabilities which are probabilities of the hypotheses, it is a probability of obtaining the evidence M we are evaluating. It is the probability that one should assign to obtaining evidence M given the background
evidence and knowledge that the hypothesis is in fact true. The third
probability is called the posterior probability of an hypothesis. It is the
conditional probability of the hypothesis on the total evidence a rational
person possesses, that is, on the background evidence E together with
the evidence M.4
Bayes Theorem relates the three probabilities for each hypothesis. s It
states that the posterior probability of an hypothesis is equal to the product of

the liklihood of the hypothesis, the prior probability of the hypothesis, and a constant. The constant factor is the same for all hypotheses and ensures
that, like the prior probabilities, the posterior probabilities will sum to
one. Bayes Theorem has great value because it reflects a very basic fact
about inductive inference. When we are trying to decide between two
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or more possible hypotheses, we may draw some inferences about what
is likely to be observed for each hypothesis given the background evidence that we have. Some outcomes may have a high probability if one
hypothesis were true and a low probability if the other were true and
vice versa. If we then observe one of the possible outcomes, we will justifiably conclude that the hypothesis which implied a high probability
for it is more likely to be true than we previously believed and the
hypothesis which implied a low probability is less likely than before. If
the prior probabilities and the liklihoods for the hypotheses can be estimated, then Bayes' Theorem can be applied to produce the resulting
posterior probability that an individual hypothesis is true on the new
evidence (here the evidence of common consent) taken together with the
prior information already known.
Since this approach is fundamental for inductive reasoning in practical
matters, in science, and in statistics, many examples could be offered.
Consider an urn that we are told contains 50 black or white balls. We can
draw 10 balls without replacement. All 10 are black. This outcome has a
probability of 1 if all the balls are black but is .31 if only 5 are white. The
probability that no more than 5 are white is .79 and the probability that
no more than 10 are white is .95. Although it is possible that as many as
40 are white, we have reason to conclude that all are black or very few
are white. Determining liklihoods for hypotheses is analogous to developing consequences of scientific theories and testing them (these consequences are deductive with probability of 1). When Einstein formulated
the general theory of relativity he derived predictions of the number of
degrees that light rays from Mercury would bend as they passed by the
sun in an eclipse and also the number of degrees of arc that the perihelion of Mercury advances per century. The predictions differed markedly from the predictions of non-relativistic mechanics. When measurements were made, they agreed closely with Einstein's predictions. The
observed evidence greatly increased the probability that the theory of relativity was true and non-relativistic theories were false.
The purpose of estimating values for the posterior and prior probabilities is to determine whether the new evidence increases the probability of
the hypothesis so that the posterior probability of the hypothesis is greater
than its prior probability. If it does so, then the evidence can be said to
support or provide confirmation for the hypothesis and the argument
will be inductively valid." Conversely if the evidence reduces the posterior probability of an hypothesis below its prior probability, then it can be
said to disconfirm or reduce support for the hypothesis. We are interested then, in whether the evidence that people believe that God exists, supports or tends to confirm the hypothesis that God does exist by raising or
lowering the posterior probability. 1£ it does, the argument is valid. If we
happen also to know that M the evidence of common consent is available
or true, then the inductive argument is also a sound argument.
Fortunately some consequences which follow from Bayes Theorem
permit conclusions to be drawn by merely focusing on the relative probability values that should be assigned to the liklihoods. It is not necessary to determine exact values for all the probabilities. If we know which
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liklihood for a set of hypotheses has the highest value, then we can show that
obtaining M makes the posterior probability greater than the prior probability
and provides confirmation for that hypothesis. In fact, it provides the strongest
confirmation. 7 Correspondingly, if we know which liklihood has the
lowest value, then we can show that obtaining M provides the strongest
disconfirmation for that hypothesis. The other liklihoods mayor may
not provide confirmation or disconfirmation. Obviously, if there are
only two hypotheses and the two liklihoods are unequal, the hypothesis
with the greater liklihood will provide confirmation and the lesser will
provide disconfirmation. Thus, if all we know is that the liklihood of
evidence is higher for one hypothesis than each of the others, this is
enough to show that the evidence supports or confirms that hypothesis.
We will show this for the consensus gentium argument thereby showing
that it is a valid inductive argument. On the other hand, if all we know
is that the liklihood of evidence is lower for one hypothesis than all the
others, this is enough to show that it is evidence against or disconfirms
that hypothesis. With these prefatory remarks in place, let us begin the
analysis of the consensus gentium argument.

Specification of Hypotheses for Analysis
Bayes' Theorem is not applicable unless it is applied to a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses. We must therefore distinguish such a set of hypotheses concerning Cod's existence. In its simplest form the argument is analyzed with two hypotheses which reveal
the essential features of the argument. It will be useful to distinguish
also a more complex version with four hypotheses to bring out important additional features.
We are interested in knowing whether the consensus gentium argument
supports theism. There are various ways to define theism. We will take
the most fundamental attributes of God to be that he is all-powerful and
all-knowing. One of our hypotheses then should be H: an all-powerful
and all-knowing personal being exists. To round out the set we take -H,
the negation or rejection of H as the other hypothesis. In the discussion
which follows, "theism" will refer to the belief that H is true and the
belief that -H is true will be termed "the rejection of theism".
A set of two hypotheses does not yield the most natural representation
of views about the existence of deities who are personal beings. A more
natural division of views produces four hypotheses. We can divide H or
theism into two hypotheses by adding the attribute of benevolence to
obtain classical theism. It is the view that the hypothesis H ct is true: a
benevolent, all-powerful, and all-knowing personal being exists. But it is
possible that an all-powerful and all-knowing personal being exists but is
not benevolent. He might be indifferent or even malevolent. Thus we
must add a second hypothesis Hnf a non-benevolent personal being that is
all-powerful and all-knowing exists. Let us call this "non-classical theism".
We can also divide -H or the rejection of theism into two hypotheses by
providing an hypothesis for the view that supernatural personal beings
with limited power or knowledge exist. Many people do not ascribe to the-
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ism but are polytheists. Thus Hp, is: supernatural personal beings with
limited power or knowledge exist. The fourth hypothesis needed to form a
mutually exclusive and exhaustive set is the hypothesis Ha: no supernatural personal beings exist. This is the hypothesis atheists hold. Some other
religious adherents who are not classified as atheists, many Buddhists for
instance, would be in agreement. Pantheists are covered by this hypothesis, since their beliefs admit a being that is supernatural in some sense but
not personal. Although this hypothesis could be split further into more
hypotheses, the analysis would become more complex without any basic
change in the results or any gain in understanding. The religious beliefs of
most people, if they are not agnostic, will identify them as holding one of
the four hypotheses. As noted, the four hypotheses case is related to the
two hypotheses case in the following way: theism or H combines the classical and non-classical theism hypotheses Hnt and H ct. The rejection of H,
or -H, combines the atheism and polytheism hypotheses Ha and Hp'
Although more complex sets of hypotheses could be defined, it seems
doubtful that any advantage in clarity is to be gained by doing so.

Specification of Evidence for Analysis
In order to evaluate the argument, it is necessary to clarify the nature
of the consent to which the argument appeals. The historical version
appeals to actual belief in God by a majority of people. We are interested
in whether the consensus gentium argument provides support for the existence of a personal being who is all-powerful and all-knowing. The evidence can be formulated in various ways. One form the consensus gentium evidence may take is:
(M) The majority of people believe that an all-powerful and a11knowing personal being exists.
As stated this implies that at least 50% of humankind (+1 person)
believes an all-powerful and all-knowing personal being exists." M
defines the common consent evidence as a simple majority of all people."
Including the beliefs of all people is the simplest choice and is most easily
related to the data currently available on religious belief. More complex
representations of the evidence would require more complex analysis
without changing the nature of the argument or the conclusions. III
Evidence about whether people actually do believe in God's existence
does not limit the possibilities. We might include in our evidence, not
only a snapshot of the state of current belief, but also the trend over time.
For example we might have evidence not only that a majority of people
now believe God exists, but also that the percentage of those who believe
has been increasing over a very long time. It is the trend of increasing
belief that Cicero finds so compelling. Thus we might specify:
(M') The majority of people believe that an all-powerful and a11knowing personal being exists and the percentage who believe has
been increasing for centuries
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as our evidence for the consensus gentium argument. A more specific
statement might be made with percentages and levels of confidence and
perhaps an average rate of increase per century for a given number of
centuries.

Evaluation of the Two Hypothesis Case
As is clear from the analysis above, the validity of the two and four
hypotheses versions of the argument turns on the relative value of the
liklihoods. It is necessary therefore to take up the question of their relative value. For the two hypothesis version of the consensus gentium argument we must impose some constraints on the possible probability
assignments for the liklihoods of Hand -H, that is, the probability of our
common consent evidence M on Hand -H respectively. We are interested in probability assignments that are reasonable-that can be justified
by plausible arguments. In the case of scientific hypotheses, deriving
consequences is usually fairly straightforward. But when the hypotheses concern the existence of supernatural beings and the probability
assignments depend on the actions, purposes, and goals of such beings,
the task of constraining the assignments for the liklihoods is much more
problematic and speculative. Nevertheless, I believe that there are plausible arguments which do justify imposing some constraints on the values of the liklihoods and, specifically, for concluding that a rational person is quite justified in believing that the liklihood of H is greater than
the liklihood of -H.
Consider the situation if -H happens to be true-that God does not
exist. Then it would be reasonable to assign some probability to the liklihood of -H, that is, to the majority of people being theists and believing
H to be true even though it is false. The appropriate probability value
would depend on the various causal factors that we think would affect
people's beliefs about God. The causal factors must be factors that may
come into play. They must be appropriate on the basis of our background evidence when we do not know ·what people's beliefs about God happen to be. The hypothesis -H as stated allows for the existence of supernatural beings although not beings which are all-powerful and allknowing. The supernatural beings could act in ways which would convince some people that an all-powerful being was at work.
Consequently, the factors which cause people to believe theism may
have a naturalistic basis or a supernaturalistic basis.
Next, let us consider the naturalistic and supernaturalistic causes present in the -H case in comparison with the case if H or theism is true. It is
not obvious that any of the naturalistic factors which tend to cause people
to accept H if God did not exist, would cease to be present if God existed.
Now consider the causes originating from supernatural action. If God
exists he might have the same motives as the supernatural beings in the -H
case to demonstrate his power. But if he did so he would be able to
demonstrate far more power. We would expect him to convince more people. If we knew that an all-powerful being existed, but not whether he is
benevolent, indifferent, or malevolent, it seems that there should be a rea-
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sonably good probability that he would act in ways which would reveal
his existence to people through answered prayer and implanted beliefs,
but also some probability that he would not do so. Further, if an all-powerful being did act to reveal his power we would expect a high probability
that a majority would believe in his existence, since there are many things
an all-powerful being could do to reveal himself. Thus, there is a non-zero
probability that if H is true the supreme being is benevolent and there is a
reasonable probability that if he is benevolent, he would want people to
know the truth about his existence. There is also a non-zero probability
that if H is true and the supreme being is not benevolent, he would act in
ways that would provide people with evidence about his existence. The
possibility that God will act in ways which provide sufficient evidence for
people to believe he exists, adds a factor for the H case which increases the
probability that the majority of people will believe God exists above the
probability for the -H case. The liklihood of H must be greater than the liklihood of -H. It follows from Bayes' Theorem that the posterior probability
of H is greater than the prior probability of Hand M confirms H. The probability of the hypothesis of theism is greater if we know M to be trIle than if we just
know all the other evidence. It also follows that the posterior probability of -H
is less than the prior probability of -H and M disconfirms -H lowering the
probability of views which reject theism.
These results are independent of the prior probabilities of theism and
the rejection of theism on the background evidence. It might be that the
falsity of theism is more probable than its truth on available background
evidence excluding M. Nevertheless, M will support theism and raise its
probability, even though it may not raise the posterior probability of H
above -H. On the other hand, if the prior probabilities of the two
hypotheses on the background evidence happen to be equal or the theistic hypothesis has a greater prior probability, then the posterior probability of H is greater than the posterior probability of -H. In any case,
whatever values we would assign the prior probabilities, M confirms H
and disconfirms -H. M provides confirmation for theism no matter what
the prior probabilities for the hypotheses are, because the posterior probability has shown an increase over the prior probability. Thus, we can
conclude that the consensus gentium argument based on evidence that a
majority of people believe in the existence of an all-powerful God is an
inductively valid argument.
While the liklihood of H is greater than -H, the disparity in probability
values may range from small to great depending on judgments made to
evaluate the liklihoods. If one judges as unlikely that an all-powerful
being would act in ways which would give people evidence that he exists,
then the difference between the liklihoods will be quite small. If we judge
these probabilities to have larger, and I think more reasonable values, a
substantial difference in the values for the liklihoods of Hand -H will
occur. Nietzsche, for example, argued that God had a moral duty to provide abundant evidence." If so, assigning .9 to the liklihood of H would
seem reasonable. However, we cannot be so certain that the agenda and
motives of a supreme being will make providing human beings with
overwhelming evidence of his existence a top priority, especially since H
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does not entail he is benevolent. A more pessimistic value of .3 for the liklihood of H seems reasonable. If an all-powerful being does not exist, the
probability of a majority being theists should be quite low. It is quite
unlikely that a majority would come to believe theism, because there
would be very little legitimate evidence for theism. In the following section a number of arguments are offered to show that functionalist arguments do not give grounds for expecting widespread theistic belief if -H is
true. Also, an analysis on the background evidence E alone, prior to
knowing which hypothesis is true, with very limited information about
people's religious beliefs, using a classification of religious beliefs with
three or more categories, indicates there is a very high probability that
none of the beliefs will be in a majority. It warrants assigning majority
belief in theism a probability less than .01. 12 If we assign a more generous
.1 to the liklihood of -H, the liklihood of Hat .3 will exceed the liklihood of
-H by 200%. If our background evidence does not give us reason to prefer
either hypothesis, that is, the prior probabilities of Hand -H are both .5,
then a 200% larger value for the liklihood of H will yield a posterior probability for H of .75 and for -H of .25, a 50% increase and 50% decrease
respectively.
The liklihood of H always exceeds the liklihood of -H, but there is
considerable variability in the degree to which it does, depending upon
the considerations taken into account to evaluate the liklihoods. It is
important to keep in mind that we are not dealing with probabilities
whose value we can specify exactly. There is an inherent unavoidable
subjectivity in evaluating inductive argument. When we assign probabilities, we cannot generally assign a precise number, but we can, if we
possess some relevant evidence, narrow it down to a range or make a
judgment about which of two liklihoods should be greater. There will
be some divergence between the values different persons assign to liklihoods on the same evidence. Nevertheless, after a discussion of various
considerations which affect the probabilities, rational men and women
should in most cases come to some rough agreement about the relative
numerical values of two probabilities.

Evaluation of the Liklihood of Ha for the Four Hypothesis Case
Let us examine the liklihoods of H a, H , H nt, and H ct for the four
hypothesis case. The first liklihood we wiR consider is the liklihood of
Ha-the liklihood that atheism or another religious view rejecting the
existence of supernatural personal beings is true. We need to reach conclusions about the probability that M is true-that the majority of people
adopt a theist position, if we do not know what people believe about
God, but do happen to know that neither God nor any other supernatural personal beings exist. It is important to stress that to properly assign a
value to the liklihood of H a , we must place ourselves in the position of
one who knows all that is currently known about human scientific
accomplishments and the technical achievements of modern life, happens to have a way of definitively knowing that God does not exist, but
does not know enough about human religious beliefs to have any idea how wide-
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spread belief in an all-knowing and all-powerful deity happens to be.
For the liklihood of Ha as well as for the liklihoods of the other
hypotheses, we must judge the probability that people's religious beliefs
will either be true or be false beliefs. For many states of affairs it may be
reasonable to assign a higher probability to a person having true rather
than false beliefs about those states of affairs. If relevant evidence is
available, we may have prima facie justification for thinking that from a
set of alternative possible beliefs people are more likely to believe the
one that is true than anyone of the possible false alternatives. One
might note that Freud believed that in the long run people would follow
reason and experience and discard religion. 13 People are able to test
beliefs and winnow out many false beliefs. Scientists follow a method of
formulating hypotheses, developing their consequences and testing the
predictions. If the predictions are successful, the hypothesis is held to be
true. If not, the hypothesis is false and is rejected. Many false beliefs are
winnowed out by a process of trial and error until a true belief is found.
The winnowing process occurs over long periods of time, although with
modern communications, discovery of truths can lead to adoption of the
new discoveries by majorities in a very short period of time. One might
also expect a process similar to natural selection in biology to operate for
human beliefs. Natural selection causes retention of genetic changes
and mutations resulting in changes in animal and human physical characteristics which are better adapted to the environment. One might
expect that the most successful societies are more likely to have correct
beliefs. An individual, group, or society may hit on a truth that allows
manipulation of circumstances to yield practical results. As a result,
that individual, group, or society may become more successful.
Successful individuals now may be copied by other comparable individuals or groups leading to success for the latter if the ideas are true.
Successful organizations or groups often will also propagate themselves.
When the success includes political or economic success, the successful
groups have an increased capacity to produce and care for more children who are taught the new correct ideas. Over many millenia they
may multiply their contribution to the earth's population. In contrast
we would expect organizations or groups that depend on false beliefs
that can affect their capacity to survive to suffer more disasters and loss
of life. The net result of all these factors will tend to raise the proportion
of people who believe the truth and lower the proportion with false
beliefs. Over a long period of time the changes can be quite dramatic.
For example, at the beginning of the 19th century the primary economic
theories were mercantilism, capitalism, and socialism. At that time only
a small proportion of people would have accepted capitalism as the best
economic system. However, within two centuries it has emerged victorious, being recognized by the great majority of people as the best means
to organize economic affairs. Considerations such as these provide
grounds for thinking that for many matters of belief, including perhaps
the realm of belief about the existence of deities, the truth is likely to win
out in the end.
Functional theories of religious belief offer a possible basis for object-
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ing to the claim that when the existence of God is at issue and people
have a choice between several beliefs, they are more likely to choose the
one that is true. Many writers, whether believing God exists or not,
have argued that religious belief serves a function which is very beneficial to society. It is argued that belief systems and myths held widely
can provide a strong cohesiveness to societies. Religious teaching may
encourage people to act more altruistically promoting the welfare of others in the society. Some theistic religions might promote the most cohesiveness and the most altruism and lead to the most successful societies.
Freud argued that society required religious doctrines to tame the asocial instincts and to provide a sense of having a defense against the helplessness people feel when confronted by the activity of nature.14 One
may argue that because such belief systems are beneficial to society, we
should expect them to occur even if they are false. It may seem as likely
that people would believe what is false in matters of religion as that they
would believe what is true. On the basis of the functional theories someone might claim that if Ha is true and no supernatural personal beings
do exist, there is still a high probability that M will be true-that the
majority of people will believe that an all-powerful and all-knowing personal being exists.
There are a number of arguments available which suggest that the
putative benefits of religion and the need for religion by functioning
societies have been greatly overplayed. First, many species of animals
form societies and co-operate to protect themselves and protect their
young without religion. Surely human societies could likewise have
formed, grown and multiplied merely as a result of the great benefits of
co-operation without forming religions. Second, if theism and polytheism are not true, societies which relied on the aid of the supernatural
beings ought to have been less successful than societies which did not.
One would expect that over time the non-religious societies would be
more successful and proliferate the most, with the result that belief in
the supernatural would be small. Third, as Hume pointed out, virtually
all early religion was polytheistic. 15 But polytheism is not a religion
which tends to tame social instincts and promote altruism. The gods are
poor examples. They do many unlawful things, which if copied by
those who worship them, would result in severe punishment at the
hands of the societies' government and legal system. In addition the service of the gods requires offerings, but does not require any moral
action.'6 Moral behavior in such societies is enforced by the government
and legal system. This observation often applies to theistic religion as
well. Fourth, it may very well be that there is a strong probability that
polytheism would develop, if not to provide cohesiveness and promote
altruism then in order to understand the world and from a tendency to
project human activity onto nature. But there does not seem to be any
necessity that theism would develop out of polytheism. 17
There are additional problems with appealing to the benefits of religion for evaluating the liklihoods. The main point which must be
stressed concerning theories based on the societal benefits of religious
belief is that the theories are problematic in this context because they
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presuppose knowledge of people's religious beliefs--the kind of knowledge reported by M. Functional theories are formulated to explain the
widespread existence of religious beliefs. Those who formulate them do
so from the standpoint of knowing what people's religious beliefs are,
including knowing whether M is true or not. In this context this
involves a kind of circular reasoning and is contrary to the ground rules
for doing a Bayesian analysis of inductive inferences. The condition for
evaluating the liklihoods for H ct and Ha is that the background evidence E does not include M nor does any of the evidence in E entail M.
We are interested in assessing the liklihood of hypotheses about God's
existence and to do so we must exclude knowledge of people's beliefs
about God and any evidence which would enable us to make inferences
about those beliefs. We must assign the liklihood of Ha from a standpoint of knowing the truth of Ha but not knowing the truth of M or any
evidence which entails it. ls
This restriction clearly rules out use of function theories as a basis for
arguing that theism should be successful in the long run. Attempts to
argue that over time theism should be more successful because theistic
religions promote more cohesiveness and more altruism require estimating the number of current adherents to classical theism and require reference to the religious beliefs of current advanced societies. Such references clearly violate the ground rules for evaluating the liklihoods.
Moreover, it is not inherently obvious why those who believe in theism
should be more successful than others, if theism is not true. The more
successful advanced societies tend to be more tolerant. They tend to
have more citizens with conflicting religious views which is a force that
is often more divisive than cohesive.
Perhaps some evidence upon which function theories are based can be
included in E, for example, evidence anthropologists and historians have
regarding the beliefs of primitive and ancient peoples which are temporally separated from us by millenia. I would argue that even this type of
evidence should not be admitted because it is evidence about human
beliefs about deities and has some relevance for projecting contemporary
beliefs. Nevertheless, suppose that we admit it and conclude that for
evaluating liklihoods we should expect religious views to be widespread.
It is not clear, however, that evidence of the religious belief systems of
primitive and ancient peoples provides grounds for assigning more than
a minimal probability to the liklihood of H a , that is, to the probability
that a majority of people adhere to theism when supernatural beings do
not exist. Even if it were true that the values of cohesiveness and promotion of altruism may increase the probability that people in societies will
adopt common religions, these values can be satisfied by non-theistic religions. A survey of religions of primitive peoples shows that most are
polytheistic, the Israelites provide the only example of the adoption of a
theistic religion. Cohesiveness results from adopting a set of common
beliefs. It does not depend on claims about the power of the supernatural beings worshipped. Nor is it clear that teachings on how to treat others must be better intrinsically in theistic religions than in non-theistic
religions. These considerations and the evidence of the beliefs of primi-
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tive and ancient peoples, if anything, tends to support increasing the
probability that people would adopt polytheistic rather than theistic
views and may render widespread atheistic disbelief in the existence of
any supernatural beings less probable. It does not support assigning
high probability to widespread belief in theism and M being true.
In order to estimate an appropriate probability to assign to the liklihood of Ha one might adopt the following perspective. Before obtaining
evidence about common consent, we may know only that beliefs must
fall into one of several categories. People might be theists, polytheists,
or those disbelieving in supernatural personal beings. With three or
four categories and no information about actual belief or which hypothesis is true, we might expect on the order of 1/4 to 1/3 of mankind to
reject belief in supernatural beings. The probability that any group
would form a majority would be very small. If we now take into
account that we know Ha is true and prayers are never answered we
might think it reasonable to hold that it is quite probable that over the
course of centuries at least 1/3 of those who believe in the existence of
supernatural personal beings would be converted to rejecting the existence of supernatural beings. This would raise the non-theist, non-polytheist group from a minority of mankind to the majority belief. If it is
true not only that the all-powerful God of theistic religions does not
exist, but that no supernatural beings with the power to answer prayers
exist either, then people would not have any prayers they uttered
answered. They of course might imagine that they had had some
prayers answered due to a happy congruence of random events.
However, in the face of reality one would expect that over time, the lack
of actual answers to prayer would tend to cause belief in deities to die
out. People who believe and rely on what is false are likely to have
lower chances of survival. Tribes believing in a supreme being might
expect that being to aid them in a crisis and be wiped out when no aid is
forthcoming. Their religious beliefs therefore probably would have a
lower probability of being passed on. The aggressive, hard-nosed realists should inherit the earth. They should be more successful in providing for their needs and passing on their beliefs, if anyone should, than
. the meek theists waiting for salvation from above. Theists would gradually be weeded out losing their land and livelihood to hard working nononsense atheists. Thus if there are no supernatural personal beings,
there is justification for raising the probability of the statement:
(N) A majority of people believe there are no personal supernatural beings.
There is no basis for raising the probability of M, however."! The probability of M which is very low on evidence E alone, remains low if we
know Ha is true. In summary, when we judge the liklihood of Ha (the
probability of M given that Ha is true) without knowledge of people's beliefs

about God, but with knowledge that no supernatural beings exist, it seems reasonable to conclude that, the probability that a majority of people are adherents to
a theist position should be quite low-less than .1. After millions of years of
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human existence, it seems quite unlikely that a majority of people would
hold theistic beliefs or have tendencies to believe what is quite false.

Evaluation of the Liklihood of H ct , H nt , alld Hp for the Four Hypothesis Case
When we consider the probability assignment for the liklihood of the
classical theism hypothesis Bet (the probability of M given Bet) we can
justifiably raise the probability that M is true significantly above the
value we would assign if we did not know that Bet is true. If we know
Bet to be true and if it is reasonable to believe that a benevolent being
would disclose himself and answer prayers in sufficient quantity to affect
human opinion or implant natural tendencies to believe the truth about
supreme beings, then we might expect that it is probable that over time a
considerable number of people would become convinced of the truth of
theism. 20 Although a benevolent being might conceivably want to remain
totally hidden and undetectable, such behavior should be attributed to an
indifferent being. Benevolent beings wish the best for others including
knowing the truth. One would expect that an all-powerful and all-knowing being, if he is benevolent toward human beings, would want people
to know the truth and create them with natural tendencies to believe
what is true, including what is true about himself. A truly benevolent
being who most likely was involved in their creation would want people
to come to him for aid when in need. We would expect him frequently to
answer prayer. If so, we might expect many people to believe that he
had answered their prayers. Only about 1/4 of non-theists would need
to be converted to theism over the course of centuries to raise theism
from the mean of 1/3 of mankind to the majority belief. It does not seem
unreasonable to think that this result is more probable than not, if theism
is true. Thus there is a basis for increasing the probability of M from the
value we would assign on the background evidence E alone, if we also
know that Bct is true. For the special case of theism, the all-powerful
being has the power at creation or later to implant and reveal truth about
his own existence to human beings in ways that they can grasp. An allpowerful being can communicate with human beings and respond to
them. Be can answer their prayers. If there is a non-zero probability that
he will do these things for many individuals, many may come to believe
in his existence until a majority so believe. Consequently the probability
of M may be very low on background evidence E alone, but should be
raised when we know B ct to be true.
The consequence of raising the probability of M allows us to conclude
that M becomes significantly more probable if B ct is true than if Ha is
true. Just as for the two hypothesis case, the existence of an all-powerful
being with the capacity to influence human belief and to communicate
with human beings and a non-zero probability that he would try to communicate with human beings raises the probability that M will be truethat a majority of human beings will adopt a theist position. Because
Bet includes benevolence, it seems justifiable to assign a higher probability for M than for B in the two hypothesis case. While it is possible a
benevolent being might remain entirely aloof, it seems reasonable to

THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM ARGUMENT

285

assign a relatively high non-zero probability to his acting to provide
people with the capacity to know the truth. The liklihood might very
well be quite high and it seems reasonable to think that M is more probable than not under these circumstances. Nevertheless, at minimum, we
would expect the probability of M if H ct is true to be greater than if Ha
is true due to the additional causal factors present.
What can we now infer regarding the liklihood of Hp which presupposes that supernatural beings with but limited power exist? The probability that a majority would believe in an all-powerful and all-knowing
deity should not be greater, if a deity with those attributes does not exist
than if a deity with those attributes plus benevolence exists. We would
expect less reinforcement of belief through answers to prayer when H
is true than when H ct is true, because there is some non-zero probability
that a benevolent, all-powerful, and all-knowing deity would answer
many prayers and requests requiring demonstration of more power than
limited beings have. Supernatural beings of limited power might
answer some or all prayers except those requiring power greater than
the power they possess. They might be unable or simply unwilling to
answer many prayers. They might not care about beings they did not
have the power to create. They might torment people giving them what
they do not want or even the opposite of what they asked for.
Moreover, if deities have limited rather than unlimited power, it is less
probable that people could or would be given special tendencies to
believe that an all-powerful being exists. If H should be true, the
actions of supernatural beings could lead to a mafority believing an allpowerful being exists, but we would expect that over the course of many
millenia of adapting to their environment, human beings would be more
likely to align themselves with the truth than what is false. The outcome
that a majority of people would come to believe in the existence of
supernatural beings with limited power seems more likely than the outcome that they would come to believe in an all-powerful God.
The conclusion we reach is that we should expect that fewer people
would exhibit belief in supernatural beings with unlimited power when
Hct is false than when it is true, because there is less capacity and motivation to communicate with, respond to, and influence human beings,
than if an all-powerful and benevolent being exists. The various possibilities suggest a moderately lower to significantly lower probability that
M will be true if Hp is true than if H ct is true. On the other hand, the
fact that there is some probability that some prayers would be answered
which might cause some people to believe in all-powerful supernatural
beings indicates assigning a higher probability to the liklihood of Hp
than to the liklihood of Ha' Thus I conclude that it seems quite reasortable to hold that people would be more likely to reject theism than to
accept it and the probability value for a majority of people believing in
theism, if Hp is true, should be less than if H ct is true, but greater than if
Ha is true.
Analysis of the liklihoods is completed by considering the fourth liklihood, the liklihood of H nt . If we consider the liklihood simply from the
standpoint that we would expect human beings after many millenia of
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learning to align themselves with the truth rather than with what is
false, then because Hnt and H ct each imply theism is true, we would
expect the same support for the truth of M for the hypothesis Hnt as for
H ct. However, if an all-powerful being exists, the probability we should
assign to a majority believing an all-powerful being exists depends also
on our expectations about the probable interaction with human beings
arising from the benevolence, indifference, or malevolence of the supernatural being. If anything, we would expect the probability of M if Hnt
is true to be less than if H ct is true, because we would expect non-benevolent beings on balance to be less motivated to communicate the truth to
people or to provide them the capabilities to discern the truth. Of
course, an all-powerful malevolent being might do more to convince
people of his existence and power than a possibly benevolent but hidden
all-powerful being. In general though we should expect the motives of a
benevolent being to cause him to do more to cause people to know the
truth than would malevolent or indifferent beings of comparable power.
The reasons for thinking that people would come to believe that an allpowerful being exists are weaker, if an existing all-powerful being is not
benevolent. There is a lower probability such a being would want people to know the truth and would try to communicate the truth about
himself to people. There is also a lower probability that he would want
to help people, to communicate with them, and to answer their prayers.
A malevolent being might diabolically remain hidden as he torments
people. An indifferent being would be less likely than a benevolent
being to act in ways which would provide sufficient evidence for a
majority of people to come to believe he exists. On the other hand, the
fact that there is some non-zero probability that supernatural beings
would communicate with human beings or respond to them in some
fashion warrants assigning a higher probability to the liklihood of Hnt
than to the liklihood of Ha' With respect to assigning a probability,
about all we can say is that it should probably be a value less than the
liklihood of H ct, but greater than the liklihood of Ha'
The conclusion that we can draw is that the liklihood of Hct has the
highest probability, the liklihood of Ha has the lowest probability, and
the liklihoods of Hand Hnt are intermediate between them. 21 Thus the
four hypothesis ve~ion of the consensus gentium argument is valid if we
know that the value for the liklihood of H ct is the greatest of the four liklihoods. At bottom the difference between a supreme personal being
existing and not existing is that, if he exists, there are additional causal
factors which may cause people to believe that he exists. The potential
causes and effects which cannot be present if God does not exist, raise
the liklihood of H ct over the other liklihoods. The existence of this inequal-

ity relation is all that really matters for the argument to work.

There are some additional consequences relevant to the function theory evidence (if it is admitted). If we admit the function theory evidence
of the beliefs of primitive and ancient peoples, the evidence may tend to
support increasing the probability that people would adopt polytheistic
rather than theistic views. Because this tends to decrease the probability
of theistic belief, that is, of the probability of M relative to all four
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hypotheses, it decreases the liklihoods for all hypotheses unifonnally rather than
relative to one another. So it seems any admissable evidence supporting
function theories would justify assigning a high probability for the truth
of a proposition other than M, for example, that a majority of people are
polytheists, and a low probability for M. Moreover, a uniform lowering of
the probabilities of the four liklihoods has the effect of increasing confirmation for
H ct .22 In any case, appealing to the functional value of religious belief
does not raise the probability of M on the various hypotheses under consideration, and, in particular, not the liklihood of Ha.

The LiklillOods when our E7Jidl'nce is of the Type Expressed by M'
What can we say about the liklihoods of Hand -H if our evidence is
M' which includes evidence of a long-term trend of increasing belief in
theism? It seems obvious that if we know that -H is true--that God does
not exist, we should expect the long-term trend to be decreasing rather
than increasing, or at least stable. With people becoming more educated
world-wide and with advancements in knowledge in scientific and technical fields, it would be surprising that increasing numbers are adopting
false theism rather than truly rejecting theism. We would expect M' to
be even more improbable than M. The fact that majority belief in theism
is increasing is more unlikely than evidence that a majority believe per
se. Thus the liklihood of -H with the evidence of M is greater than the
corresponding liklihood with the evidence M'. So we should assign a
low probability to discovering M' to be true when we are given -H&E.
For the liklihood of H, an increasing percentage of theists is just what
we might expect, if we know H to be true. We should expect increasing
belief to be more probable than majority belief per se. Thus the liklihood
of H with the evidence of M is less than the corresponding liklihood with
the evidence M'. It follows that because the disparity between the liklihoods of
Hand -H with M' as evidence is greater than for evidence M, possession of evidence for M' provides stronger confirmation than does M. It is evident also
that the inequality relations among the liklihoods which held for the four
hypotheses case with M as evidence will hold also for M' as well. The
disparity between the liklihoods for classical theism and atheism will also
be greater for M' than for M by the same reasoning applicable to the two
hypotheses case. 23
As stated earlier, the statement of the common consent evidence could
be much more complex. The evidence might be stated as a conjunction of
statements reporting the numbers of people belonging to the different
categories of belief. For statements indicating the existence of a greater
number of theists than other categories of belief, the Bayesian analysis
will show confirmation for theism. 24

Some Examples
At this point I will illustrate some implications of the preceding
analysis by offering several examples with probability assignments
which make the liklihood of H ct the greatest, and the liklihood of Ha the
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least, for the four hypotheses case, and the liklihood of H greater than
the liklihood of -H for the two hypotheses case. 2; The assignments for the
examples are intended to be illustrative only. The examples make the implications of the application of Bayes' Theorem more concrete. They provide a sense of the strength of the support for each alternative hypothesis provided by the consensus gentium evidence. Since we are only interested here in the support provided by the common consent evidence, we
will suppose that the prior probabilities on the background evidence E
for the hypotheses are equal. For the four hypotheses version we assign
.25 as a neutral value for the prior probabilities and for the two hypotheses version we assign .5.
For the first example we rely on the arguments above against functionalism and the analysis given in Endnote 12 for assigning a very low
probability to widespread theistic belief if Ha is true. Let us assume also
that after centuries of potential activity by a benevolent supreme being
people would have considerable evidence for his existence and a value
for the liklihood of Hct of .5 or more seems reasonable. Although
Nietzsche and other atheists would probably want a much higher value,
a being that is so far above us in knowledge might have an agenda
which does not give top priority to providing human beings with
uncontestable evidence of his existence. We assign the values .5, .35, .14,
and .01 to the liklihoods H ct , H nt, H p ' and Ha respectively. Then the
resulting posterior probabilities for the corresponding hypotheses are .5,
.35, .14, and .01. Classical theism represented by H ct undergoes a 100
percent increase in probability, while the probability of Ha falls to 4% of
its previous value. 26 With liklihood assignments such as these the consensus gentium argument has significant force, providing strong confirmation for classical theism and strong disconfirmation for the belief that
there are no supernatural personal beings. Evidence that majorities of
people believe classical theism should be taken seriously.
As a second example suppose that we, in response to the urging of
Nietzsche and other atheists, assign a very high probability to the liklihood of H ct' namely, .9 and a slightly higher probability of .1 to the liklihood of Ha and that the values .9, .5, .5, and .1 now represent the liklihoods Hcv Hni' H p ' and Ha' The posterior probabilities .f?r H ct, ~nt'
H p ' and Ha now become: .45, .25, .25, and .05. The probabihty of theIsm
equals .7 and the probability of -H is .3. 27 Classical theism represented
by H ct has undergone an 80 percent increase in probability, while the
probability of Ha has sustained an 80% decrease in probability. The
probability of theism is up 40 percent from its prior probability and the
probability of -H is down 40 percent from its prior probability. This
reflects the fact that the consensus gentium argument provides stronger
confirmation for classical theism than for theism per se and greater disconfirmation for atheism and other views rejecting supernatural personal beings than the simple rejection of theism.
Suppose now that someone does not accept the arguments for a low
liklihood for Ha' He or she believes that functionalist arguments warrant giving the liklihood of Ha a much higher value, say,.4. We now
assign the liklihoods H ct' Hni' H p ' and Ha the values .9, .6, .5, and .4.

THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM ARGUMENT

289

The posterior probabilities for H ct , H nt, H R, and Ha now become: .38,
.25, .21, and .17. Classical theism representea by Hct has undergone a 50
percent increase in probability, while the probability of Ha has sustained
a 33% decrease in probability. There is still confirmation for classical
theism, but it is not as strong when the liklihood values have been unduly inflated in this way.2'

ls the Valid Consensus Gentium Argument Also Sound?
If the consensus gentium argument is to have usefulness, it must not
merely be valid, but also sound. It is sound only if we actually possess
the evidence M or M'. The question which remains, then, is whether the
evidence actually does show that M or M' are true. Because the evidence required to make a definitive judgment has not been collected in a
scientific manner either in sufficient quantity or quality, I shall not
attempt to make any definitive pronouncements. This must be reserved
for some time in the future when much more comprehensive evidence
has been collected. Nevertheless I do believe there is sufficient evidence
to believe M and M' are true. In the future, if the long-term trends continue and more comprehensive and accurate public opinion and psychological data is available for the world population, it is likely that we will
be in a position to make more definitive judgments about the soundness
of the consensus gentium argument.
Let us consider the available statistics. The data which do exist seem
to show that M is true. If we could use the U.S. opinion poll data as our
basis, the answer would be a resounding "yes". For example, a Gallup
Poll in 1971 indicated 98% of the people in the United States believed in
God's existence. 2c; More recent surveys show about 95% of the U.s. population believes God exists.") Most other countries in which scientific
surveys were taken also have large majorities of theists.]l
It is really the world population as a whole that is at issue, however.
The best indication of belief in God for the world population is given by
estimates of adherents to the various world religions. For the world as a
whole, the 1997 Encyclopedia Britannica provides estimates of the number
of adherents for the various world religions. Out of a total world population of 5.80 billion, there are an estimated 3.10 billion adherents to the
Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths which are dearly theistic. Thus at
least 53 percent are estimated to be theists. The Sikhs and other people
who are theists but are believed to be adherents of religions which are
not really theistic may add a couple of percentage points. It is possible
also that some people categorized as non-religious may believe theism is
true. The non-theist group could comprise as much as about 47 percent
of the world population.
We should be cautious with these numbers. The estimates are based on
various assumptions. They are not based on survey data for many groups
of people. Also, care is in order for the people classified as non-religious.
It is difficult to assess how extensive this group is, for many of the people
who apparently belong in the category of non-theists live or have lived
until recently under totalitarian governments where there has been heavy
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indoctrination in atheism and strong penalties for expressing belief in
God. Now that the former Soviet Union provides freedom of religion,
more of its citizens may be theists than is reflected in the numbers. China
still has harsh penalties for adherents of Christianity. Membership in a
church is dangerous. There may be more Chinese who do believe in God
and would express this belief if they had greater freedom of expression,
than are reflected in the numbers. We might consider excluding some
people from our estimates because the information is somewhat unreliable or because their beliefs probably have been partially coerced and subject to indoctrination. The population of China is about 1.2 billion. Of this
.84 billion were classified in the non-religious and atheist categories. If we
excluded only the people in the People's Republic of China from the totals
because the data are unreliable and probably skew the results, then of the
remaining 4.6 billion people, 67 percent are classified as theists, 6 percent
are atheists or non-religious, and the remaining 27 percent believe in
supernatural beings, but are not theists.
It is interesting that there are actually relatively few outright atheists.
They are estimated to total .22 billion or 3.8 percent of the world population. Moreover, nearly all reside in China or countries in the former Soviet
Union where the populations have been subjected to heavy indoctrination.
The atheists in other countries are less than 1 percent of world population.
The estimated size of the group which would reject the existence of supernatural beings, if one includes atheists and the non-religious, is 1.11 billion
or 19 percent. Adding some Buddhists will augment the total by one or
two percentage points. The remaining non-theists are Hindus or adherents
of a variety of other religions which are mostly polytheistic in nature.
Do we have evidence for M'--that theistic belief has been increasing
over time? It is quite clear that it has been. If we go back in time, the
evidence on this point, which is sketchy even now, becomes of course
far more sketchy. However, some rough estimates can be made. In the
time of Christ, theistic belief was probably limited primarily to the Jews,
who probably represented less than 4 percent of the estimated 300 million world population. l3 Even if we also allow for many Hindus and
educated pagans effectively being theists, it is doubtful that theists could
have accounted for more than 10 percent of the world population.
The year 1800 is a more recent year for which a very rough estimate can
be made. Because the areas populated by European and Semitic peoples
(plus an appropriate fraction of population in India-Pakistan, Indonesia,
and Southeast Asia estimated to be Muslim) cannot have accounted for
much more than 35 percent of world population, it is doubtful that theists
could have comprised more than about 1/3 of world population in 1800.
This is probably an upper bound. The true number could be below 30%.
Since theists now apparently comprise a majority, the long-term trend has
been increasing. M' therefore appears to be true also.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the consenSllS gentium argument in the form based on M
and M' has proven inductively valid from the standpoint of a Bayesian
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analysis of inductive reasoning. Classical theism receives stronger support than a definition of theism which does not incorporate the attribute
of benevolence. Consequently, if there is adequate justification for
believing either M or M' is true, there will be support for God's existence, and the argument will be sound. Since, to my knowledge, properly conducted studies of the evidence relevant to M and M' have not been
undertaken for the world population as a whole, the best one can do is
to make a subjective assessment on the evidence readily available. The
evidence available does seem to show that M and M' are probably true.
The available statistical data tend to show that the majority of people are
classical theists or have a natural tendency to accept classical theism.
Indeed, if the long-term trend of increasing theist belief continues and
use of opinion polls spreads world-wide, it may not be too long before
we will be in a position to pronounce unequivocally that the consensus
gentium argument is sound. Hence it seems reasonable to think that the
consensus gentium argument does provide support for God's existence.
Yet whether or not M and M' are true and a version of the argument is
sound, it is clear that the consensus gentium argument is not a fallacious
inductive argument, but is inductively valid and as an argument has far
greater merit than is usually supposed.

Fullerton, CA
NOTES
This paper is a revision ofa paper I gave to the Philosophy of Religion
Society in Southern California in 1983. I want to thank Prof. Stephen T.
Davis for urging me on several occasions to publish it, for reviewing it, and
for his helpful comments. I also thank Prof. William Wainwright for his
contribution to improving the paper.
1. Paul Edwards, "Common Consent Arguments for the Existence of
God," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. It p. 147.
2. A thorough discussion and justification for holding that a Bayesian
approach is needed to satisfactorily explicate scientific and inductive reasoning is to be found in Scientific Reasoning: the Bayesian Approach by Colin
Howson and Peter Urbach, (LaSalle, Ill.:Open Court, 1993).
3. This approach to reasoning to God's existence is covered thoroughly
in The Existence of God by Richard Swinburne (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991).
4. If Pr(A) is the probability that a statement A is true, the conditional
probability Pr(A/B) is the probability that A is true when B is given or
already known to be true. By definition Pr(A/B) = Pr(A&B) /Pr(B). If Mis
our inductive evidence and E is the background evidence, the prior probability of an hypothesis Hi then is Pr(Hj/E). The liklihood is Pr(M/Hi&E) and
the posterior probability is Pr(H· /M&E).
5. Bayes' Theorem is simply a consequence of the definition of conditional probability. To apply Bayes' theorem, the set of hypotheses Hi (j=1, 2
.. n) relative to which we are examining evidence must form a mutually
exclusive and exhaustive set. Let S equal the sum of the products of the liklihood and prior probability, that is, the sum of the n Pr(M/Hi&E)Pr(Hj/E)
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terms for the n hypotheses Hi. For a set of two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive hypotheses, H =Hl and -H = H2' 5 becomes:
5 == Pr(M/H1&E)Pr(Hl/E)+Pr(M/H2&E)Pr(H2/E).
1/5 is the constant factor. For a four hypothesis case, 5 will have four terms.
By assumption we know the background evidence to be true. Pr(E) therefore
has a probability of 1 which entails by the definition of conditional probability that the probabilities Pr(Hi&E) and Pr(H/E) are equal and can be interchanged in the formulas. Bayes' Theorem for Hi which is derived from the
definition of conditional probability is
Pr(H/M&E) = Pr(M/H i&E)Pr(H/E)(1/5)
where 5 as given above is the sum of the products of the liklihood and prior
probability for all the hypotheses Hi.
6. "Confirmation" here does not imply that the support is adequate to
justify holding an hypothesis. It may be adequate. But the term only implies
that it provides support by increasing the probability of the hypothesis.
Similarly "disconfirmation" here does not imply that the evidence is adequate to justify rejecting an hypothesis. It may be sufficient. Use of the term
just means that it decreases the probability of the hypothesis.
7. This is demonstrated as follows. The prior probabilities in the terms
of S must sum to 1 because the probabilities of the hypotheses Hi must sum
to 1 (the Hi are mutually exclusive and exhaustive). The prior probabilities
therefore act as weights. It is evident that the greatest value S can attain
occurs if a prior probability equals 1 and the liklihood for that hypothesis is
the liklihood with the greatest probability. S would then equal that liklihood
since all other terms are zero. However, the prior probabilities cannot equal
one since contrary to assumption the hypothesis would be entailed by the
evidence. Thus S < Pr(M/Hi&E) where Pr(M/Hj&E) is the liklihood with
the highest probability. A similar argument shows S > Pr(M/Hi&E) where
Pr(M/Hi&E) is the liklihood with the lowest probability. This has a very
straightforward consequence for a two hypothesis case. If we can show or
have good grounds to think that one of the two liklihoods is greater than the
other, say the liklihood of H is greater than -H, then Pr(M/ -H&E) < S <
Pr(M/H&E). Consequently Pr(M/H&E)/S > 1 > Pr(M/-H&E)/S and from
Bayes' Theorem it follows that Pr(H/M&E) > Pr(H/E), or M confirms H.
Thus for a two hypothesis case all that is necessary is to determine which liklihood is greater and we can determine immediately from Bayes' theorem
that its hypothesis is supported by the evidence M. It also follows that the
evidence disconfirms the other hypothesis. If there are more than two
hypotheses, matters are a little more complicated, but it still must be the case
that of the liklihoods for the the hypotheses, the one with the highest probability must be greater than S and the liklihood with the lowest probability
must be less than S. Hence the Pr(M/H i &E)/S factor with the liklihood with
the highest probability must exceed 1 and Bayes' Theorem shows that the
evidence M provides confirming evidence for that hypothesis Hi. Similarly
the Pr(M/Hi &E)/S factor for the liklihood with the lowest probability musf
be less than 1 and the evidence M provides disconfirming evidence for that
hypothesis Hi. Thus for a four hypothesis case, if we can determine which
liklihood is greatest, we can determine from Bayes' theorem that its hypothesis is supported by the evidence M. If we know that a liklihood is greater
than the reciprocal of the constant factor then it will provide confirmation. If
it is less it will disconfirm it.
8. The actual evidence will be a statistical estimate based on statistical
samples of human opinion polls. Estimates are subject to error. If very thorough polls with representative samples are taken, sampling errors will be
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small. Thus we might find, for example that after thorough polling of
humankind that 55% are theists and that we have 99% confidence that the
correct value exceeds 50%, that is, that M is true. We could devise a more
specific statement of M giving estimated values and statistical confidence levels. To do so would introduce an unnecessary amount of complexity. M as
stated is sufficient to bring out the essential features of the argument.
9. Some might desire the people polled be limited to those who are educated or to those who specialize in the philosophy of religion. For some subject matters, e.g. theories of quantum mechanics the views of non-specialists
are clearly irrelevant. However, it is not evident that for questions related to
the existence of an all-powerful God, the views of average people can be
judged irrelevant. God might conceivably give them evidence of his existence. Can one be sure he will provide evidence only to the learned? Besides
who should determine the criteria for selecting the population whose views
are to be sampled? The results might tend to be biased from the method
used to select the population.
10. As stated M does not specify the exact level of belief. M may be stated more exactly as, say: 53% of the world population are theists. It is also
possible to include the level of disbelief. For example, the evidence M could
be: 53% of the world population are theists and 47% do not believe theism is
true(to simplify we ignore the undecideds). Or, a more exact statement yet
would be:
(M*) Of the world population, 53 percent are classical theists(believe
H ct )' 28 percent believe H ,4 percent are atheists(believe H a ), 0 percent are non-classical theisPsCbelieve H nt ), and 15 percent are agnostic
or non-religious.
The difficulty raised is that we now have to evaluate liklihoods which are
very specific values, for example, that on hypothesis Ha there will be exactly
53% theists and 47% non-theists. There is enough subjectivity involved that
we are not in a position to assign probabilities to the liklihoods for such specific statements of the evidence very well. One might also differentiate with
ranges. For example, consider the statement M**:
(M**) Of the world population, between 50 and 60 percent are classical
theists(believe H ct ), between 20 and 30 percent believe H , less than 10
percent are atheists(believe H a ), 0 percent are non-classical~heists(believe
H nt ), and between 10 and 20 percent are agnostic or non-religious.
Notes 24 and 28 show that evidence statements of this form will also provide
confirmation for classical theism.
11. Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 53.
12. There are various methods we could use to estimate the probability
that M is true if we have very limited information to go on-little more than
the fact that beliefs are highly dependent on the beliefs of the community in
which one grows up. If we begin with the question of the probability of M
versus the probability that the majority of people are not theists, then we
might assign a 50% probability to each. However, it does not seem natural to
lump polytheists and atheists in the same category. We should use at least 3
categories of belief. This results in much lower probabilities for majority
belief. We might take account of the fact that the 75 most populous countries
comprise about 94% of mankind and the 75 major linguistic groups about
87%. (Based on the World Data section of the Encyclopedia Britannica, 1997
Yearbook, pp. 762-767, 776-780.) This suggests that we can distinguish about
75 to 90 major ethnic groups that comprise over 90% of mankind. Although
the groups vary in population size, we might make a simple model based on
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75 major ethnic groups and assume them to be equal and their beliefs about
ultimate things to be homogeneous. If we consider at least three categories of
religious belief: theism, polytheism, and denial of supernatural personal
beings, and assign all individuals in each of the 75 groups distinguished by
the model to one of the three categories, randomly, with a 113 probability for
each, the mean for each should be (25 groups) or 113 of mankind. The probability that a majority (38 groups) holds anyone of the three options would
have to be at least 3 standard deviations above the mean. For each category,
the probability is consequently less than 1 percent that the adherents form a
majority of world population. Hence, the probability that none of the three
views are held by a majority should be greater than 97%. Thus on the background evidence E alone, prior to knowing which hypothesis is true, we
would expect to assign a very low probability to M being true. If we then
add Hat H ,Hntt or Hct!o E and estimate from the standpoint of knowing
which of tl-R. hypotheses Hat H p ' Hnl! or Hct is true, the probability of Mean
be raised from .01 and assigned a higher value if the hypothesis gives us reason to think that more evidence should be available to enable people to come
to a knowledge of the truth.
13. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an lllusion, trans. James Strachey (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1961), p. 69.
14. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. James Strachey (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1961), especially pp. 7-10, 20-24, 29, 30, 47.
15. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion in Dialogues and The
Natural History of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 135.
16. Ibid., pp. 177-83.
17. Ibid. Hume presents his theory about the origin of polytheism pp.
138-41 and his theory of how theism originated from polytheism pp. 154-55.
Although the theory has some plausibility and is a possible explanation of
the origin of theism, the transition from polytheism to theism does not
appear to be necessary or perhaps even likely.
18. Appealing to functionalist theories to estimate the liklihood is tantamount to determining the probability to assign to Pr(M/M&Ha&E) which
equals 1 rather than to estimating Pr(M/Ha&E).
19. The analysis in Note 12 indicates a probability of .01 for the liklihood
of H to be warranted.
If Ha happens to be true-that supernatural personal beings do not
exist, we can assign the probability c to the majority of people believing theism even though it is false. The probability value assigned to c depends on
the various causal factors that may come into play that we think would affect
people's beliefs about God when we do not know what people's beliefs about God
happen to be. If c is the probability value for the liklihood of H a , what probability should then be assigned to the liklihood of H ct ? If H ct is true, there are
two cases: a) an all-powerful benevolent being exists and does not act in
ways which human beings are capable of detecting, and b) an all-powerful
benevolent being exists and does act in ways which human beings are capable of detecting. For the first case God does not act in ways which change the
human epistemic situation from the Ha case. It is not obvious that any of the
factors which tend to cause people to become theists and make c a good
assignment if God did not exist, would cease to be present if God existed.
The probability should be the same as for the Ha. case, namely c. If the second case holds and God does act in ways whiCh provide evidence for his
existence which would not be present if he did not exist, then we should
assign a probability value b to the majority of people being theists where b >
c. There is an additional factor present in the Hct case which increases the
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probability that the majority of people will believe God exists above the
probability for the Ha case. We can combine the two cases to estimate the
liklihood of H ct if we consider that there is a non-zero probability that an a1lpowerful benevolent being, if he existed, would provide people with sufficient evidence to attain true beliefs about his existence. If this probability is
d, then an appropriate estimate of the liklihood of H t might be found by the
sum of the probabilities for the two cases weighted by the probability that it
occurs: Pr(M/H t&E) = db + (l-d)c. If d is not equal to 0 and b > c, nwltiplying both sides ofb > c by d and adding (l-d)c to both sides yields db + (l-d)c
> c. But this is just Pr(M/l-!ct&E) > Pr(M/Ha &E). The liklihood of H ct is
greater than the liklihood of H .
21. Symbolically Pr(M/I1ct &E) > Pr(M/Hp&E) > Pr(M/Ha&E) and
Pr(M/Hct&E) > Pr(M/Hnt&E) > Pr(M/Ha&E).
22. To see this assign .25 to the four priors and Pr(M/Hct & E) = .5,
Pr(M/H t& E) = .3, Pr(M/H & E) = .3, and Pr(M/H a & E) =.1. Then
Pr(Hct/~&E) = .42 and is a 61610 increase over the prior and Pr(H /M&E) =
.08 and is a 67% decrease from the prior. Subtract .05 from the fiklihoods.
Then Pr(Hct/M&E) = .45 and represents an 80% increase over the prior and
Pr(Ha/M&E) = .05 and is an 80% decrease from the prior showing greater
confirmation and disconfirmation respectively for H ct and Ha' Raising all
four liklihoods an equal amount, for example by .1, can reduce the strength
of support for theism, for example, using .6, .4, .4, and .2 for the four liklihoods yields Pr(Hct/M&E) = .375 and Pr(Ha/M&E) = .125 which represent
merely a 50% increase and decrease for H ct and Ha respectively. Then even
if we did allow the admissable evidence for functionalism to be used to
increase rather than decrease the four liklihoods, we would not alter the fundamental relationship between liklihoods that makes the consensus gentium
argument a valid argument. Whatever the value of the liklihood of Hw the
liklihood of Hct must be higher yet, and in fact the highest of the four liklihoods. Whether or not an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent personal being exists, if we accept any evidence of the functional benefits of religious belief as part of the background evidence, then the probability of the
liklihood for H ct is no lower than for Ha since the same causal forces such as
societal cohesiveness and promotion of altruism would be operative in either
case. But in addition, the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and
benevolent personal being increases the probability that people will believe
that he exists, because his existence taken together with a non-zero probability that he would make an effort to communicate the truth about himself to
people raises the the probability for the liklihood of Hct over the probability
for the liklihood of Ha' The argument still works, although a uniform rise in
liklihood probabilities may weaken the force of the evidential support.
23. This means that the liklihood values satisfy the following relation:
Pr(M' /H&E) > Pr(M/H&E) > Pr(M/-H&E) > Pr(M' /-H&E).
24. If the evidence is stated so that the number of persons belonging to
each category of belief are distinguished (as in M** of Note 10), then arguments
similar to those given in the text will show confirmation for theism. If Ha were
true, we would expect that after millions of years of the struggle for survival,
the vast majority of surviving persons would either be atheists or non-religious
since realists would be more likely to survive than those who put their trust in
the aid of supernatural beings. One should expect the percentages of people
who believe H ct' H nt, or H to be low and the atheists and agnostics to be
high. By analysis corresporlaing to that presented in the text, the difference
between the observed percentages and the expected percentages will cause the
posterior probability of Ha to come out less than its prior probability.
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In the case of H t(or H), the Iiklihood of M** on H t(or H) and E will be
higher than its likli~ood on Ha and E or on H and if, because M** reports
that there are twice as many people who believfHct(or H) than believe either
H or H . This conforms much more closely with what we would expect if
H~t(or were true. This fact will cause the posterior probability of Hct(or
HJ after learning of M** to be greater than its prior probability. Of course,
the degree of support would be yet greater if 90 percent of the world population were classical theist. Nevertheless, M** provides support for H ct and H
and makes the consensus gentium argument valid.
2S. That is, Pr(M/Hct&E) > Pr(M/H &E) > Pr(M/H &E) and
Pr(M/H.ct&E) > Pr(M/H,nt&E) > Pr(M/Ha&Ef for the four hyporheses case
and Pr(M/H&E) > Pr(M/-H&E) for the two hypotheses case.
26. If we assign a significantly lower probability to the liklihood of H ct'
the degree of confirmation can still be quite strong. For example, let us
assign the values .1, .06, .03, and .01 to the liklihoods H ct, Hntt H p ' and Ha
respectively. Then the resulting posterior probabilities for the corresponding
hypotheses are .S, .3, .1S, and .OS. Classical theism represented by H t undergoes a 100 percent increase in probability, while the probability of ifa falls to
20% of its previous value.
27. To provide additional insight into the relation between the two
hypotheses version and the four hypotheses versions we use probability
assignments for the two hypotheses case which agree with the assignments
offered for the four hypotheses case. Pr(H/E) == Pr(Hct/E)+ Pr(HntlE) == .S
and Pre-HIE) == Pr(H /E)+ Pr(H /E) == .S. If Pr(M/Hct&E) == .9,
Pr(M/Hnt&E) = .5, Pr(MJH..R&E) = .5, ~nd Pr(M/Hq&E) =.1 and we average
Pr(M/Hct&E) and Pr(M/ t:t.nt&E) to estimate PnM/H&E) and average
Pr(M/H &E) and Pr(M/H_&E) to estimate Pr(M/-H&E), we obtain
Pr(M/HIE) = .7, and Pr(M/ -fi&E) = .3. The resulting posterior probabilities
for Hand -H are .7 and .3.
28. More complex representations of the consensus gentium evidence will
also show support for classical theism even if there is also substantial disbelief
in theism. For example, Nietzsche and other atheists who believe that God
has a moral duty to present overwhelming evidence might claim that if God
exists he should proVide plenty of evidence so that we should expect 90+% to
be theists and less than 10% to be non-theists. It might then seem to them
that if we obtain evidence that theists are in the SO-60% range and non-theists
in the 40-S0% range, then the evidence ought not to confirm theism.
However, evidence of SO-60% theists would still provide evidence confirming
theism. To be sure, if we should assign a higher liklihood to 90+% theists than
SO-60% theists, finding evidence that more than 90% are theists would then
provide stronger confirmation than evidence of SO-60(10 theists. To see more
clearly how this works, let us define MO as: 0-10% of the world population are
theists and 90-100% are non-theists. We then define Ml: 10-20% of the world
population are theists and 80-90% are non-theists, and define M2 as: 20-30% of
the world population are theists and 70-80% are non-theists, and so on for M3
through M9. Thus MS would be: SO-60% of the world population are theists
and 40-S0% are non-theists, and M9: 90-100% of the world population are theists and 0-10% are non-theists. To keep things reasonably simple we ignore
agnostics and undecideds. For each of the ten statements of the evidence MO
through M9 there are four liklihoods we can evaluate. For MS we must evaluate Pr(MS/Hct&E), Pr(MS/Hnt&E), Pr(MS/H &E), and Pr(MS/H &E). The
analysis of the feasible liklihood assignments for the evidence M gas shown
that Pr(M/Hct&E) must have the highest probability value and Pr(M/Hjl.&E)
must have the lowest value. This relation must hold also for the evidence
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statements MO through M9. Thus for n = 0, 1,2, ... ,9, Pr(Mn/Hct&E) is
greater than Pr(Mn/Hnt&E), Pr(Mn/Hrr&E), and Pr(Mn/Ha&E). Also,
Pr(Mn/Ha&E) is less than Pr(Mn/Hct&E), Pr(Mn/Hnt&E), and
Pr(Mn/H &E). It is also clear that the MO to M9 options are mutually exclusive and ;rxhaustive so that the liklihoods relative to each hypothesis should
sum to 1. Thus Pr(MO/H t&E) + Pr(M1/Hct&E) + ... + Pr(M9/Hct&E) = 1
and Pr(MO/Hnt&E) + Pr(~I/Hnt&E) + ... + Pr(M9/H t&E) = 1, etc. Let us
assign values to some of the liklihoods in a manner whi~ heavily weights the
90+% range giving a higher probability to Pr(M9/H ct &E) than to
Pr(M5/Hct&E). For example, let Pr(M5/Hct&E) = .04, Pr(M6/ Hct&E) = .06,
Pr(M7/I:Ict&E) = .10, Pr(MS/Hct&E) = .15, and Pr(M9/Hct&E) = .25. Let
also Pr(M5/H a &E) = .02, Pr(M6/H a &E) = .015, Pr(M7/H a &E) = .012,
Pr(MS/Ha&E) = .OOS, and Pr(M9/H &E) = .005. Several additional probabilities must be assigned in order to cafculate posterior probabilities for M5 and
M9. Let Pr(M5/H nt &E) and Pr(M5/H &E) = .03 and let Pr(M9/H t&E) =
.025 and Pr(M9/H &E) = .02. Using prior probabilities of .25 for me four
hypotheses, we can~lOw compute posterior probabilities for M5 and M9. The
posterior probabilities for M5 are: Pr(Hct /M5&E) = .33, Pr(Hnt/M5&E) = .25,
Pr(Hp/M&E) = .25, and Pr(Ha/M&E) = .17. The posterior probabilities for
M9 ate: PrCH t/M9&E) = .S33, Pr(Hnt/M9&E) = .OS3, Pr(H /M9&E) = .067,
and Pr(Ha /i:r9&E) = .017. This shows M5 does provide support for H ct ' The
posterior probability shows a 33% increase from the prior probability. Of
course, M9 does, as would be expected, provide stronger confirmation for Bet
than does MS. Although many non-theists like Nietzsche might believe that
God has a duty to provide them with all the evidence that they want, it is possible that a being vastly superior to us, while having a moral duty to provide
substantial evidence, might have an agenda and motivations which do not
give providing human beings with uncontestable evidence of his existence,
the priority we might hope or expect. Because we cannot definitively predict
the behavior of a supreme being who is far above us in knowledge, we should
not overweight the probabilities for the 90+% range. If we assign .5 to the liklihood pr(M/Hcr&E), then a more balanced and equal allocation of this probability to the iiI< ihoods Pr(M5/Hct&E) through Pr(M9/Hct&E) would seem
more reasonable.
29. Gallup Opinion Index, April 1971, Report No. 70. 99% of those lacking
a college education believed in "a God."
30. Niemi, Richard, John Mueller, and Tom W. Smith, Trends in Public
Opinion: A Compendium of Survey Data, (Greenwood Press: Westport, Conn.,
19S9), p. 253.
31. Gallup Opinion Index, April 1971, Report No. 70. The percentages for
European countries are lower than for the U.s., but still a majority believe in
"a God," for example, West Germany-S1 %(9% undecided) and Great
Britain-77%(13% undecided). Sweden had significantly fewer theists than
other countries~0(7c(14% undecided).
32. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1997 Yearbook, p.311.
33. The population figures for the first century and 1S00 are based on estimates by John Durand in "The Modern Expansion of World Population",
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. III, No.3, June, 1967, pp.
136-159. The author used the Durand estimates for different geographical
regions and assumed the Moslem proportion of the population in the countries of Southeast Asia has remained fairly static since lS00. The estimate of
the Jewish population at the beginning of the Common Era was based on figures cited in Encyclopedia Judaica, (1971), s.v. "Population."

